[A]s an incident to the arrest the officers could, as a precautionary matter and without probable cause or reasonable suspicion, look in closets and other spaces immediately adjoining the place of arrest from which an attack could be immediately launched. Beyond that, however, we hold that there must be articulable facts which, taken together with the rational inferences from those facts, would warrant a reasonably prudent officer in believing that the area to be swept harbors an individual posing a danger to those on the arrest scene.

If you have a firearm or other deadly weapon in the car, tell the officer and explain where the weapon is located.

Women driving alone at night should be extra-cautious when a police car has flashing lights on and the officer is signaling them to pull over. A woman has every right to continue driving in a safe manner to a well-lit area, such as a convenience store lot, a gas station or a shopping center. If the officer is in an unmarked police car or in civilian clothes, the woman should ask him to summon a marked car. If he refuses, use your cell phone to call 911. Before reaching for the phone, however, explain what you are doing; otherwise the officer may think you are going for a weapon.

Turn off the ignition. Turn on the interior lights. Thereafter, keep your hands in plain view.

If the officer says you are suspected of driving "under the influence" of alcohol, you should always agree to a blood, urine or breath test, even if you are innocent.

"You want to know why I rob banks?" Rountree said. "It's fun. I feel good, awful good. I feel good for sometimes days, for sometimes hours."

[Jury Note]
"Let us be very clear — this is not a hung jury based upon a lack of unanimity. This is a jury that has ceased to be able to conduct respectful, open-minded, good-faith deliberations."

"Our courts have consistently held that the protections afforded under the Virginia Constitution are co-extensive with those in the United States Constitution." Bennefield v. Commonwealth, 21 Va. App. 729, 739-40, 467 S.E.2d 306, 311 (1996). See also Lowe v. Commonwealth, 230 Va. 346, 348 n.1, 337 S.E.2d 273, 275 n.1 (1985) (explaining that protections under Virginia's Constitution and statutes are "substantially the same as those contained in the Fourth Amendment"); O'Mara v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 525, 535 S.E.2d 175 (2000) (explaining that the protection of the right to free speech is co-extensive with federal constitutional protection). Because the rights guaranteed by the Virginia Constitution and the United States Constitution are co-extensive, we use the same analysis.

Paris v. Commonwealth (2001)

I have to object for the record to the Court to consider the fact that he wished and exerted his right to go to trial against him, and not considering the guidelines just because he didn't enter a guilty plea.

Burpo argues that the trial court violated his constitutional right to a fair trial and deprived him of his right to liberty without due process under the Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth Amendments. He claims these rights were violated at sentencing when the trial judge indicated that he departed from the sentencing guidelines because of Burpo's "not guilty" plea. Burpo contends that the Constitution forbids a trial court from penalizing a defendant for asserting his constitutional rights. See e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965); Doyle v. Ohio, 426 U.S. 610 (1976).

Upon a review of the record, we find that the constitutional issue Burpo raises on appeal was not properly preserved. Rule 5A:18 states in pertinent part: No ruling of the trial court . . . will be considered as a basis for reversal unless the objection was stated together with the grounds therefore at the time of the ruling, except for good cause shown or to enable the Court of Appeals to attain the ends of justice. A mere statement that the judgment or award is contrary to the law and the evidence is not sufficient to constitute a question to be ruled upon on appeal.

The purpose of the rule is to afford the trial court an opportunity to rule intelligently on the issue presented. Weidman v. Babcock, 241 Va. 40, 44, 400 S.E.2d 164, 167 (1991). The rule applies to all types of cases, including those with constitutional rights at issue. See Swann v. Commonwealth, 247 Va. 222, 229, 441 S.E.2d 195, 201 (1994) (consideration barred because objections not based on the constitutional grounds asserted for first time on appeal); Ashby v. Commonwealth, 33 Va. App. 540, 544-45, 535 S.E.2d 182, 185 (2000) (Rule 5A:18 barred consideration of speedy trial issues under United States and Virginia Constitutions); Jacques v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 591, 593, 405 S.E.2d 630, 631 (1991) (Rule 5A:18 barred consideration of statutory argument not raised in trial court); Cottrell v. Commonwealth, 12 Va. App. 570, 574, 405 S.E.2d 438, 441 (1991) (Rule 5A:18 barred consideration of constitutional question not raised in trial court). Burpo did not raise the constitutional issue in the trial court. Furthermore, the record does not reflect any reason to invoke the good cause or ends of justice exceptions to Rule 5A:18 to allow us to consider the constitutional issues that Burpo asserts for the first time on appeal. "In order to avail oneself of the exception, a defendant must affirmatively show that a miscarriage of justice has occurred . . . ." Redman v. Commonwealth, 25 Va. App. 215, 221, 487 S.E.2d 269, 272 (1997). Without even a mention of Rule 5A:18 or ends of justice, it is obvious that there is no affirmative showing of cause for invoking the rule.

In the course of Bailey's trial, the trial court appointed three attorneys, sequentially, to represent him. While represented by counsel, Bailey filed pro se motions and insisted on certain unreasonable strategies. Additionally, Bailey failed to cooperate with his attorneys and expressed dissatisfaction with their efforts despite their diligent representation.

Daniel Hall, Bailey's first attorney, filed several speedy trial motions and vigorously argued on Bailey's behalf at trial. Yet, at the outset of trial, Bailey complained that Hall had not subpoenaed certain witnesses. The trial judge did not credit these complaints, observing that Bailey was "talking, rambling on about family members. I assume he would have recourse to write or call his family members if [he] wanted to tell you about it. This matter has continued on, and on, and on, so we're going to proceed with the case." After his conviction, Bailey, in disregard of Hall's status as his attorney, filed various pro se pleadings and also filed a habeas corpus petition alleging Hall's ineffective representation. Hall moved to withdraw, stating that Bailey's conduct made his continued representation impossible. Hall's motion was granted.

The court appointed Paul Bland as Bailey's second attorney. Despite the appointment, Bailey continued to file pro se motions and, almost immediately after his appointment, Bland moved to withdraw, noting that Bailey told him that he had filed "habeas on all of his cases, including the one that counsel previously represented him on in 1992." Bland believed that Bailey's statement "created an adversarial relationship with counsel, and counsel [felt] it appropriate to withdraw." The court granted Bland's motion.

Philip DiStanislao was appointed as Bailey's third attorney. Despite the appointment of yet a third attorney, Bailey filed a pro se pleading on June 1, 1998. Barely more than one month after his appointment, DiStanislao moved to withdraw as counsel because Bailey set forth unreasonable terms and conditions for his representation, requiring him to communicate with Bailey by mail only and not in person. DiStanislao stated that these conditions "ma[de] it impossible for him to provide effective representation for Mr. Bailey as it is extremely unlikely that any positive form of attorney-client relationship can exist."

[Thereafter Bailey represented himself]

[Either] (1) the defendant placed his counsel in a position that precluded effective representation and thereby constructively discharged his counsel or (2) through his obstructionist behavior, dilatory conduct, or bad faith, the defendant de facto waived counsel.

Vick [the deputy] had been the Wood family's minister for nearly 15 years and had helped Wood during previous episodes with mental illness.

. . .

The evidence also showed that Wood was a deeply religious man who had a "personal and priestly" relationship with Vick, who had counseled Wood spiritually many times because they both attended the same church. And, the appeals court said, evidence showed the sheriff's department chose Vick to conduct the interview with Wood because of that relationship and the belief that Wood would talk to him -- and despite misgivings about potential problems with that decision.

[A] defendant may not assert that rulings made on pre-trial motions prior to a mistrial are binding upon the trial court in a subsequent trial unless the trial court adopts those rulings on its own motion or in addressing a motion of one or both of the parties. In the absence of a ruling in the second trial adopting the rulings of the aborted trial, the defendant is required to renew his motions with specificity in order to preserve the record of the trial court's rulings and the defendant's objections thereto for any subsequent appeal of the retrial.

Elliot v. Commonwealth (2004)

"I cannot imagine any responsible citizen would have objected to giving the name.'' - Scalia

A public defender who was punched in the face by his client in open court has been permitted to withdraw, while a second public defender who refused to take the case was held in contempt Tuesday.

Attorney Fred Goodman had asked to withdraw because he might press assault charges against the defendant, Malik El-Shabazz, 20, who is on trial for the rape and murder of a 6-year-old girl.

A second lawyer with the Public Defenders Association, Andrea Konow, who witnessed the sucker punch in court Monday, said that she, too, could not in good conscience represent El-Shabazz in the death-penalty case.

Common Pleas Judge Jane Cutler Greenspan agreed to let Goodman step down but the judge held Konow in contempt of court. Konow was led out of the courtroom by sheriff's deputies.

The case is seen as so important that the privy council - the final court of appeal for the Caribbean and some other former British colonies, but made up mainly of UK law lords - which normally sits in panels of five, has decided to field nine judges for the first time.

The large cast of judges and lawyers means that the case cannot be heard as usual in the privy council building in Downing Street, but will be argued over six days in the Moses Room in the Palace of Westminster.

Before opening arguments began Monday, two jury members and an alternate juror were excused because they are distant cousins of an attorney with the prosecutor's office, George Burnett. Judge Steven Taylor criticized prosecutors for "inexcusable conduct" in not revealing the links sooner.

§ The [Richmond Public Defender’s] office uses Windows 95, has old computers and very slow internet access. Until recently, the office had just two printers for the entire office, which spans the floor of a downtown office building. Now the office has three printers. There is no IT person on staff; the Public Defender Commission has two IT staff members for the 21 public defender offices. When they get “new” equipment, it is typically left-over castoffs the Public Defender Commission has accumulated: a “new computer” can be four years old. Unlike the Commonwealth Attorney’s office, the Public Defender staff lacks the capacity to view digital photos from the Medical Examiner’s office. In an age where digital photographic equipment is the standard, the office has two Polaroid cameras and an old video camera. (p.37-38)

. . .

§ In Richmond, a court-appointed attorney who took over 300 appointments in one year told us that they constituted 20% of his income, as he had a largely successful retained criminal practice. We asked how he could provide quality service to both his appointed and retained clients, he said he can’t. “In retained felony cases I work hard to investigate the case, look for witnesses, consider discovery and the use of an outside expert.” In felony cases for court-appointed clients, “I tell them to investigate the case themselves, look for witnesses and if they find them bring them to the office or to court. Frequently I interview the witnesses just before trial and hope they will help the case. Sometimes they screw up the case and I have to scratch around for a plea.” (p.50)

I. WHETHER APPELLANT WAS DENIED THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO CONFLICT FREE AND EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL WHEN THE LEAD DEFENSE COUNSEL AND APPELLANT ENGAGED IN A SECRETIVE HOMOSEXUAL RELATIONSHIP.

II. WHETHER THE ARMY COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT APPELLANT?S SEXUAL RELATIONSHIP WITH HIS LEAD DEFENSE COUNSEL DID NOT CREATE A CONFLICT OF INTEREST DENYING APPELLANT EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL.

A professor who claimed she was targeted in a hate crime that stirred student protests at the Claremont colleges is suspected of staging the vandalism herself, police said Wednesday.

Kerri F. Dunn's car was vandalized and covered with racist, anti-Semitic and sexist epithets on March 9, leading faculty to cancel classes and students to stage rallies the following day.

Two witnesses interviewed by police investigators allegedly saw Dunn, a visiting professor of psychology at Claremont McKenna College, commit the vandalism, police said in a statement.

The Indigent Commission is a typical government response to a problem. When one was started [in North Carolina] the first thing it did was hire an executive director and staff. None of these people represent anyone, indigent or otherwise. That office has an overhead of about $500,000 per year. Then a series of meetings was scheduled.

The commission consisted of judges, legislators, law professors, and a few prominent (i.e. rich) criminal defense lawyers. Page after page of rules were proposed and passed. The forms we filled out to get paid got revised and grew longer. Standards were set. Training was mandated.

While the Indigent Commission was sold to lawyers as a way to improve defense, it was sold to the legislature as a way to control costs. Few law-and-order legislators really care whether defendants get an adequate defense, most can't vote.

None of this solves the true problem. The state does not pay enough to get the job done. North Carolina will eventually shift to a "socialized" criminal justice system. Full-time government employees will handle both prosecution and defense. The public defenders the state hires will have to be paid a decent wage comparable to other government lawyers. This system will provide a sound basic defense for almost all criminal defendants. There will be less legislative griping about costs since full-time state employees are hard to paint as high-living money grubbing lawyers.

The down side is that people like you and I will be out of the loop. We will care less about what happens in criminal court because we never go there. The criminal courts will become the territory of government lawyers. I'm not saying that public defenders can't do a good job. However, overall far fewer lawyers will have any front-line criminal defense experience. That will be a loss to the profession and to justice.

Since 1971, for example, Virginia has increased the average amount it pays court-appointed lawyers by $12 per case. The average amount paid in 1971 was $233; today, it's $245.

A burglary suspect is lying in hospital after a man he allegedly burgled on Friday "bumped" into him on a Pretoria street on Monday morning.

"I punched him and threw him against a wall a few times. After he stopped struggling I put my foot on his throat and called the police," burglary victim Fabian Ohlson said.

"This thing is going to mushroom. If my client had to be arrested, at least he's going to bring down a lot of police officers."

In nations where democratic institutions and the ballot box provide a peaceful means for evolutionary change, it is unacceptable to circumvent the system and to pursue political or other goals by unlawfully raining down violence on a society and its citizens.

As it was, [the trial] lasted for nineteen weeks. Toward the end, we started receiving good vibes from the twelfth juror, an expressive young lady who was doing everything but winking at us. Then one day Judge Sear abruptly halted the proceedings and sent the jury home early. We were called into chambers and instructed to return in two hours. Oddly, we were told to return via the judges' private elevator in the courthouse basement. We were also instructed not to discuss this cloak and dagger plan with anyone. Slim had to lead Mike Fawer out of chambers before he twisted himself into orbit.

Upon our return, we were ushered into a closed courtroom. and on the witness stand before us sat a man with a paper bag over his head. "What the fuck is this about," Mike whispered as he began to quake again. Judge Sear informed us that an FBI undercover agent, the man with the paper bag over his head, coincidentally had been in a cocktail lounge when he had overheard the twelfth juror say the government's case was weak. Of course, the government was now moving to disqualify her. Mike orbited.

At least we would be given the opportunity to cross-examine the man with the paper bag over his head and, desperately trying to compose ourselves, we were about to embark on this strange new experience when suddenly loud pounding came from the locked courtroom doors. Two news reporters were demanding access. Judge Sear became apoplectic. He demanded to know who had violated the secrecy order. We all proclaimed our innocence. Upon questioning the news reporters through closed doors, the Judge learned that while they had been eating at the Bon Ton the reporters had spotted Al Winters, with his six-foot, six-inch, two hundred fifty pound frame, crossing Magazine Street with a man with a paper bag over his head! Big Al, mostly a drug and gun man, had acted too quickly.

Still without reporters (and almost without Big Al). we commenced cross-examining the man with the paper bag over his head. The tale became even more bizarre. Admitting that the encounter with the twelfth juror had not been his only one. the man with the paper bag over his head incredibly claimed that he had seen her unexpectedly on other nights in other barrooms, one of which was located clear across town. This had been an undercover operation all right, one designed to disqualify the twelfth juror. When the defense engages in this kind of conduct, it's called jury tampering. Most of us were shell-shocked. Carlos [the Defendant], the calmest person in the courtroom, watched with resigned bemusment.

The twelfth juror finally was brought into the closed courtroom and told of the government's accusations. She was devastated. She denied having made any such statements, and swore her impartiality. Judge Sear denied the disqualification motion and, instead, allowed us to decide whether she should continue to serve. We decided to keep her. but undoubtedly the government's outrageous conduct irretrievably intimidated this juror.

[In the Terry Nichols case a] prospective juror said she overheard other possible panelists say they would say anything to get on the jury. The woman was retained on the panel.

"I'll do whatever it takes to get up there," she paraphrased one of them as saying. "I'm going to say what I can to get on the jury. My decision is already made."

She said she overheard three or four jurors make similar comments when more than 350 people summoned for jury duty in the case met for orientation February 23. None of the people she overheard make the statements are among the 37 prospective jurors still being considered for Nichols' jury, she said.

Congratulations, you're a Throne! A member of the third highest choir, you have the dubious distniction of existing in the realm where the emenations from God begin to take material form. Thus, you are the strangest-looking of God's servants, and are described as a giant wheel with many eyes. This may be more of a reference to your primary function, however, which is to carry justice and the essence of God Himself to the Earth and through the Heavens, than an accurate reflection of your appearance. More than any other angel, you are humble, patient and just- attributes required of one who bears God and His justice as a chariot bears its rider.


What Order of Angel Are You?
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We were chilling [at Pelletier's house] drinking. After a while we saw Amy [sic] walking her dog up the street. I called her over to us. The dog left. I asked her if I could fuck. She said OK. So I fucked it, while you keep drinking. . . . Any side question they ask say I don't know I was drunk. When I finished fucking, Amy [sic] asked for some beer. . . . She left about 7:30. If they ask how we know, you had a watch on. We chilled and drank till 8:30. You made a phone call for a ride. About 9:00 you left and went home or wherever. I'm fine after that. You got to memorize this shit. I need you bad on this. . . . I walk away from this two ways! A dead man or a rich man. I wanna be rich! When this is in your head till it hurts, burn this letter!

Federal authorities argued that Benu was sentenced in 1991 to more than a year in jail for cocaine possession in Maryland, precluding him from possessing firearms. He had been detained earlier in 2002 on charges of taking AK-47 ammunition across state lines, buying a 9 mm pistol and semiautomatic rifle, and taking a pistol across state lines.

Benu pleaded no contest to the charges in April 2002, but reserved the right to argue whether his gun and ammunition purchases were really illegal.

U.S. District Judge Norman Moon denied Anderson's and Friedman's arguments about whether Benu was allowed to possess a firearm.

Then Benu researched the issue and discovered that the Maryland gun law in question was different at the time of his conviction. Moon had the attorneys submit written arguments, then dismissed the case.

Assistant State's Attorney Maureen Platt said the defense is flawed.

"His pants could have been down because he was mooning a car he was drag racing," Platt said. "His pants could have been down because he was urinating out of a window. His pants could have been down because he wasn't feeling well."

Eight hours after a Saudi man was acquitted by a federal jury of all charges for carrying three small sparklers on a flight from Germany to Boston and was told he was free to leave, five federal officers stormed his South End apartment just after midnight Saturday and arrested him for not having a valid visa. He was jailed until he flew home late that afternoon.

This provision is not intended to punish a defendant for the exercise of a constitutional right. A defendant's denial of guilt (other than a denial of guilt under oath that constitutes perjury), refusal to admit guilt or provide information to a probation officer, or refusal to enter a plea of guilty is not a basis for application of this provision. In applying this provision in respect to alleged false testimony or statements by the defendant, the court should be cognizant that inaccurate testimony or statements sometimes may result from confusion, mistake, or faulty memory and thus, not all inaccurate testimony or statements necessarily reflect a willful attempt to obstruct justice.

Asked about a recent study that showed Virginia is near the bottom of the list of states in compensating public defenders, Horan was unequivocal. "I think it's nonsense," he said. "If anything, public defenders get paid more than prosecutors.

The Pacific Lumber Co. [against whom the district attorney had previously brought suit], through its corporate parent Maxxam Inc. of Houston, has fueled the recall of District Attorney Paul Gallegos with $229,000 in contributions.

a juror was arrested and charged with public intoxication after appearing unsteady and groggy when he returned from lunch