One fire, completely believable.
Two fires, wicked bad luck. Three fires, no way.
State v. Vuley (Vt. No.
2011-087, 2013)
The man who wins the lottery once
is envied; the one who wins it twice is investigated.
U.S. v. York, 933 F.2d
1343 (C.A.7 (Ill.), 1991).
The
doctrine of chances (also known as the doctrine of objective
improbability) is generally recognized to have sprung from the
English case of Rex v. Smith,
11 Cr. App. R. 229, 84 L.J.K.B. 2153 (1915)(the death of a third wife
by drowning in a bath tub allowed introduction of the first two
wives' deaths by drowning in bath tubs) and to have entered American
jurisprudence in United
States v. Woods,
484 F.2d 127 (4th Cir. 1973)(when the seventh child in a woman's care
died with symptoms of cyanosis evidence of the prior deaths was
admitted to establish the corpus delicti). However, as Woods
recognizes, there was already long established precedence in American
common law that “prior acts can be proved to establish the corpus
delicti
of arson.” Id.
At 135, citing
State
v. Schleigh,
210 Ore. 155, 310 P.2d 341, 348 (1957) (eight fires along the same
road the defendant was on were allowed into evidence to show motive,
common scheme, and to negative inadvertence); State
v. Smith,
221 S.W.2d 158 (Mo. 1949) (proof of a prior fire was admissible to
show that a second fire was incendiary); People
v. Wolf,
334 Ill. 218, 165 N.E. 619 (1929) (proof of fire in the house was
admissible to
show that the burning of the barn was caused by human agency);
State
v. Ritter,
288 Mo. 381, 231 S.W. 606 (1921) (proof of prior fires admissible
to show intent, show
that the fire in question was of incendiary origin, and also to prove
the corpus
delicti,
or connect the appellant with same);
People
v. Jones,
123 Cal. 65, 55 P. 698 (1898) (proof of burning of four separate
buildings admissible to prove corpus delicti).
The
purpose of the admittance of prior occurrences under the doctrine of
chances is to show that lack of accident or, as older cases state it,
to “negative inadvertence.” This doctrine is particularly well
suited for cases in which insurance claims are involved. In York,
supra, evidence of one murder where the defendant was the beneficiary
of a life insurance policy on the deceased was admissible in a later
murder trial where the defendant was the beneficiary of a life
insurance policy on another deceased. Of course, insurance claims are
also involved in arsenous fires. “Where
the same person has a series of fires and collects insurance, it
furnishes a basis for an inference, of more or less strength, that
the fires were not accidental.”
People v. Harris, 263 Ill. 406, 418 (Ill. 1914). See also
People v. Mardlin, 487
Mich. 609 (2010)(four previous fires with insurance claims allowed
into evidence in trial of a fifth fire with an insurance claim), &
State v. Allen, 301
Or. 569, (1986)(proof of an arson with an insurance claim in 1975
allowed as evidence in an arson with an insurance claim in 1982).
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