New Review of Rehabilitating Lochner
1 hour ago
Adopting the Old Rule as the New
When I became a lawyer I don't recall being told that I lost my 1st Amendment right to freedom of speech. However, it appears that the Virginia Bar has decided that ...
The 2009 Virginia Medical Examiner's report is online and these are the 5 counties with the highest percentage of drug deaths ...
This is from early this year at the University of David A. Clarke Law School. It was a symposium titled "Life After the War on Drugs." ...
I respectfully dissent. I do not agree that the circuit court abused its discretion in denying the defendant's motion for a jury trial made at the very moment his trial was to begin and after he had voluntarily waived his right to such a trial. True, this was the waiver of a cornerstone right, but the courts uphold waivers of such rights every day. To me, this is more a case of a defendant trying to play fast and loose with the court system in order to delay being tried than it is a case of an abuse of judicial discretion. I would affirm the judgment of the circuit court.The next was by a Judge on the Court of Appeals. In an opinion which is complex enough that I had to read it four times, the Judge complains about how the Virginia Supreme flouts its own ruling on the subject of jurisdiction.
Cokes Jr v. Commonwealth
Notably, in concluding in Jay that a dismissal rendered a rule violation jurisdictional, the Supreme Court expressly stated that “to hold otherwise would mean that, if an appellant did not list cases alphabetically in the table of citations as required by Rule 5A:20(a), dismissal of the appeal would be mandated as a jurisdictional matter.” Jay, 275 Va. at 520, 659 S.E.2d at 317. Yet curiously on April 30, 2010, the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted comprehensive amendments to its Rules which, contrary to the holding in Jay, permit, and in some cases require the dismissal of a petition for appeal for failure to comply with various Rules including, among other things, the failure to file a compliant table of contents or authorities. See Rule 5A:26 (“If an appellant fails to file a brief in compliance with these Rules, the Court of Appeals may dismiss the appeal.”); see also e.g. Rule 5A:12(c)(1)(ii) (“If the assignments of error are insufficient or otherwise fail to comply with the requirements of this Rule, the petition for appeal shall be dismissed.”) (Amendments to Part 5A of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Virginia adopted April 30, 2010 and effective July 1, 2010) (emphasis added). Since Jay expressly holds that deficient briefs and other rule violations which are readily curable are not jurisdictional and, thus, ought not result in dismissal of an appeal, the plain language in the amended Rules would seem to be in clear conflict with the holding of Jay and, thus, it may well be that when effective, these amended Rules will have the effect of overruling Jay. However, that is a decision for another day.Wow. I thought the only people who called out appellate opinion writers were smug, overconfident, self-important blawgers. ;-)
Smith v. Commonwealth
McWatters also argues that the trial court erred in denying his motion to disqualify the [prosecutor] for the Nineteenth Judicial Circuit. He contends that the [prosecutor] should have been disqualified because the [prosecutor] listened to phone calls McWatters made to his lawyers while he was an inmate at the Martin County Jail. This Court has stated that "disqualification is proper only if specific prejudice can be demonstrated. Actual prejudice is `something more than the mere appearance of impropriety.' Disqualification of a [prosecutor] is appropriate `only to prevent the accused from suffering prejudice that he otherwise would not bear.'" Farina v. State, 680 So. 2d 392, 395-96 (Fla. 1996) (citations omitted) (quoting Meggs v. McClure, 538 So. 2d 518, 519-20 (Fla. 1st DCA 1989)). A ruling on a motion to disqualify is reviewed for abuse of discretion. Id. at 395.
At a hearing on McWatters' motion, evidence was presented that the jail systematically recorded all calls made by inmates. A recording was played before each conversation that advised the inmate: "This call is subject to monitoring and recording." After listening to the recorded calls to counsel in camera, the trial court denied the motion. The trial court found that McWatters' statements were limited in a "fashion that strongly indicates his knowledge that he is being monitored or recorded" and that other calls demonstrated that he "clearly knows that he is subject to being recorded." The trial court concluded that "[t]here was no reasonable expectation of privacy in those calls and there was a voluntary waiver of privilege by Mr. McWatters in the face of that lack of reasonable expectation of privacy." The trial court added that there was no evidence "that the substance of these calls provided any benefit to the prosecution" or was used to "any detriment to Mr. McWatters." We agree.
Section 90.502, Florida Statutes (2006), establishes a statutory privilege for communications between a client and his or her lawyer. The attorney-client privilege "attaches only to confidential communications not intended to be disclosed to third persons who are not furthering the rendition of legal services." Mobley v. State, 409 So. 2d 1031, 1038 (Fla. 1982). "Whether a communication is confidential depends on whether the person invoking the privilege knew or should have known that the privileged conversation was being overheard." Id. Before every call, McWatters was warned that his calls were subject to monitoring and recording. This Court has held that an inmate has no reasonable expectation of privacy in a telephone communication from jail where the inmate is warned that all calls are monitored or recorded. See Jackson v. State, 18 So. 3d 1016 (Fla. 2009), cert. denied, 78 U.S.L.W. 3417 (U.S. Jan. 19, 2010). There was no reason for McWatters to believe that his phone calls to defense counsel would be excluded from this warning. Thus, McWatters waived his right to confidentiality. Based on the foregoing, we find that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in denying McWatters' motion to disqualify the [prosecutor].
McWatters v. State
1.3(c) A lawyer shall not intentionally prejudice or damage a client during the course of the professional relationship, except as required or permitted under Rule 1.6 and Rule 3.3.So, I guess defense attorneys are going to need to make sure their cars are in good working order so they can get to the jails/prisons and stop taking calls from inmates - because, no matter how many times you warn them, I guarantee they'll say things a prosecutor would love to hear.
