CrimLaw

Death - the Federal Supreme Court:

(1) Monday the Court will hear an amazingly wide ranging review (Info from this page on FindLaw / links are on that page):

Delma Banks, Jr. v. Janie Cockrell, Director, Texas Dept. Criminal Justice
No. 02-8286

Question:
Did the 5th Circuit err in rejecting Banks' claim under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), that the prosecution suppressed material witness impeachment evidence that prejudiced him in the penalty phase of his trial, on the grounds that: (a) the evidence supporting the claim was procedurally defaulted, notwithstanding the fact that there was no reasonable basis for concluding that counsel for Banks could have discovered the suppressed evidence prior to or during that trial or state post-conviction proceedings; and (b) the suppressed evidence was immaterial to Banks' death sentence, where the panel neglected to consider that the trial prosecutors viewed the evidence to be of "utmost importance" to showing a capital sentence was appropriate?


Did the 5th Circuit act contrary to Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) and Williams v. Taylor, 529 U.S. 362 (2000), when it weighed each item of mitigating evidence separately and concluded that no single category would have brought a different result at sentencing without weighing the impact of the evidence collectively?


Did the 5th Circuit act contrary to Harris v. Nelsen, 394 U.S. 286 (1969) and Withrow v. Williams, 507 U.S. 680 (1993) in holding that Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(b) does not apply to habeas proceedings because "evidentiary hearings" in those proceedings are not similar to civil trials?

There appears to be a wide variety of things that the Defense intends to try to put before the Justices:

Banks' attorneys will tell the court Monday that prosecutors hid evidence and systematically eliminated all blacks from the jury. They'll say that before his one-day trial, Banks' first lawyer interviewed no witnesses and failed to review the prosecution's evidence. He did not investigate Banks' social history or school records prior to the penalty phase of the trial. And the appeals courts never gave those lapses the attention they deserved, Banks' lawyers will argue.
. . .
[O]ver the past few terms, the court has been reshaping the nature of capital punishment by ordering changes in the way defendants reach death row.

The justices, led by newer members of the court who are still shaping their view of capital punishment, have outlawed executions of the mentally retarded; required juries rather than judges to impose death sentences; blasted racial jury-stacking in capital cases and heightened the standards for defense lawyers in death penalty cases.

Banks' case involves several of those issues and others, leading some experts to believe the justices may take another broad swipe at the existing capital system in their ruling.

(2) However the case which is getting more press is the Court's decision to make the call on whether Ring is retroactive:

In Ring v. Arizona, decided in June 2002, the court held that juries rather than judges had to make the crucial factual determinations that separated convicted murderers eligible to be sentenced to death from those who were not. While juries in most states have the role of determining the existence of "aggravating factors," five states — Colorado, Idaho, Montana and Nebraska, in addition to Arizona — gave that role to judges.

Inmates in those states with cases still on appeal received new sentencing hearings, and the states have changed their laws to conform to the Ring decision. The question for the Supreme Court now is whether inmates who have exhausted their direct appeals in state courts can bring habeas corpus petitions in federal courts to challenge the constitutionality of their death sentences.

Here's an article from Idaho, an article from Nevada, and an article from Nebraska - all discussing the potential effect of retroactive application.